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I. Introduction and Background
THE SPATE OF CASES' IN BELLWETHER LAND use states which have
divested owners of development rights in land, together with in-
creased interest of local governments in a vehicle for extracting
concessions from would-be developers,2 have resulted in consider-
able interest in so-called "developers' agreements." 3 Such agree-
ments between local governments and developers, usually sanc-
tioned by state statute,4 set out, inter alia, various use limitations
and infrastructure/public facility exactions sought by the former,
and the freezing of land use controls for a fixed period together
with service guarantees for the latter.' Conspicuous among states
with such statutory procedures are California and Illinois.6 At least
*The author gratefully acknowledges the help of the following British col-
leagues and correspondents who generously provided citations, articles and
commentary on development agreements and planning gain in the United
Kingdom: Gerald Dix, Lever Professor of Civic Design, University of Liverpool;
J.F. Garner, LL.M., Professor of Public Law (retired), University of Notting-
ham; Sir Desmond Heap, LL.M., sometime Solicitor and Controller, City of
London and Past President, the Law Society; Nigel Mobbs, Chairman, Slough
Estates Limited; Victor Moore, LL.M., Professor of Law, Reading University.
1. See, e.g., County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., 65 Hawaii 318;
653 P.2d 766 (1982); Avco Community Developers Inc. v. South Coast Regional
Comm'n 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976). See generally C. SIEMON, W.
LARSEN & D. PORTER, VESTED RIGHTS (1982) [hereinafter cited as C. SIEMON];
Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use Permits, 11 Sw. U. L.
REV. 545 (1979).
2. See generally C. SEIMON, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Callies, Land Use Controls: of Enterprise Zones, Takings, Plans
and Growth Controls, 14 URB. LAW. 781, 831 (1982); Holliman, Development
Agreements and Vested Rights in California, 13 URB. LAW. 44 (1981); Hagman,
Development Agreements, in 1982 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 173
(F. Strom ed. 1982).
4. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-65869.5 (West 1983); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-15.1 to 11-15.1-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985).
5. Hagman, supra note 3, at 181, 186-89.
6. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-65869.5 (West 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 24, §§ 11-15.1 to 11-15.1-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85).
one state, Hawaii, has considered and rejected similar legislation.7
Another, Washington, has recently enacted legislation limiting (by
type and time) municipal-developer agreements on certain de-
velopment fees and exactions.8 While the few courts which have
had the opportunity to review such legislation (and agreements
executed thereunder) have generally approved,9 serious questions
concerning the "bargaining away of the police power" and limiting
of the duties and actions of future local legislative bodies remain to
be addressed by most jurisdictions. As between the sanctity of the
contracts clause of the federal constitution and the need of local
and state governments to act "unfettered" in the public interest,
which controls? This dilemma is particularly vexing when the local
government agrees not to change its land use regulations, clearly
affecting its ability to exercise the police power in the future.'" It is
therefore useful to examine what practices concerning developers'
agreements and exactions exist outside the United States, where
legislation authorizing such agreements has been in place for many
years." Such agreements--often covering exactions called "plan-
ning gain,"' 2 not otherwise normally obtainable by local govern-
ment-are the subject of section 52 of the latest version of En-
gland's benchmark Town and County Planning Act. 3
H. Developers' Agreements
A. The British Land Control System in Brief
In England, the development of land more closely resembles a
privilege than a right. The completion of several land use studies,'
7. H.R. 1208, 12th Leg. Hawaii (1983). See comment on earlier Hawaii bills in
Hagman, supra note 3, at 197.
8. S. 4972, 47th Leg., 1st Ex. Sess., Wash. (1982) (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 82.02.020 (Supp. 1985)).
9. Hagman, supra note 3, at 186-87.
10. Meegan v. Village of Tinley Park, 52 I11. 2d 354, 288 N.E.2d 423 (1972);
LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Village of Villa Park, 42 I11. App. 2d 529, 356 N.E.2d 182
(1976); City of Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 154 Colo. 535,392 P.2d
467 (1964); Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Brookville Turnpike Construction
Co., 246 Md. 117, 228 A.2d 263 (1967).
11. Hagman, supra note 3, at 198; D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 923 (2d ed. 1980).
12. Planning Gain: The Law Society's Observation 1982 J. PLAN. & ENV'T L.
346.
13. Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, ch. 78, § 52 (found in 41 Halsbury
Stat. 1572-2022).
14. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
INDUSTRIAL POPULATION, CMD. 6153 (1940); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LAND
UTILIZATION IN RURAL AREAS, CMD. 6378 (1942); REPORT OF THE EXPERT
COMMrrrEE ON COMPENSATION AND BETTERMENT, CMD. 6386 (1942).
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coupled with the physical destruction and turmoil resulting from
World War II, led England to adopt in 1947 a sweeping land use
planning law 5 which abolished the private right to develop land.
Extending to every acre in the British Isles, the law requires a
landowner to seek local government permission to undertake any
form of land development. Land development is broadly defined
as the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other opera-
tion in, on, over or under land or the making of any material
change in the use of any buildings or land.16 Although the law
provides for the drawing up of both general and area-specific
development plans which would characterize certain lands as
appropriate for development, even owners of such land must seek
permission from local government before commencing develop-
ment. Moreover, a local government may legally deny such an
application for development even though its own development
plans show such land in a development category. 7 While the law
purports to "nationalize" or condemn existing development rights
by setting up a multi-million dollar fund against which landowners
denied development permission can (for a time) claim, no one in
England doubts the law would be valid without such "just"
compensation.' 8 Moreover, the British tax laws levy a develop-
ment tax on new, permitted development which, since 1947, has
ranged from 30 percent to 100 percent of the value of the develop-
ment "increment" upon land value. 9
B. The Statutory Framework for
Developers' Agreements
The basic language of Section 52 of the law sets out the parameters
of the British developers' agreement:
52.-(1) A local planning authority may enter into an agreement with any
person interested in land in their area for the purpose of restricting or regulat-
ing the development or use of the land, either permanently or during such
period as may be prescribed by the agreement; and any such agreement may
contain such incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions of a
financial character) as appear to the local planning authority to be necessary or
expedient for the purposes of the agreement.
15. Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, amended by Town and Country
Planning Act, 1971, ch. 78, § 52.
16. Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, ch. 78, at §§ 22 and 290.
17. D. HEAP, AN OUTLINE OF PLANNING LAW 88 (6th ed. 1973); see generally
Garner & Callies, Planning Law in England and Wales and in the United States, 1
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 292 (1972).
18. J. B. CULLINGWORTH, TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING IN ENGLAND AND
WALES 15-33 (2d ed. 1967).
19. Id. at 110-31.
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(2) An agreement made under this section with any person interested in land
may be enforced by the local planning authority against persons deriving title
under that person in respect of that land, as if the local planning authority were
possessed of adjacent land and as if the agreement had been expressed to be
made for the benefit of such land.
(3) Nothing in this section or in any agreement made thereunder shall be
construed-
(a) as restricting the exercise, in relation to land which is the subject of any
such agreement, of any powers exercisable by any Minister or authority
under this Act so long as those powers are exercised in accordance with the
provisions of the development plan, or in accordance with any directions
which may have been given by the Secretary of State as to the provisions to be
included in such a plan; or
(b) as requiring the exercise of any such powers otherwise than as mentioned
in paragraph (a) of this subsection.
(4) The power of a local planning authority to make agreements under this
section may be exercised also-
(a) in relation to land in a county district, by the council of that district;
(b) in relation to land in the area of a joint planning board, by the council of
the county or county borough in which the land is situated,
and references in this section to a local planning authority shall be construed
accordingly.
Restrictive covenants in England "run with the land" as they do
in the United States. However, positive covenants (requiring a
developer to do something on his land) do not run with the land in
England." Indeed, the whole notion of developers' agreements
under section 52 has been criticized on the ground that such
agreements may not be entirely enforceable by a landowner
against a recalcitrant local authority.1
C. The Use of Developers' Agreements
Under Section 52 of the Town and
Country Planning Act
One of England's leading members of the bar22 has recently com-
pleted a study' of so-called planning bargaining or "planning gain"
20. See, e.g., Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
21. Letter from J. F. Garner, Professor of Public Law (retired), Nottingham
University, to the author (Dec. 9, 1982).
22. Jeffrey Jowell, Barrister and Professor of Public Law, University College,
London. The reader will recall that the British legal profession is divided into
barristers, those who practice before the courts, and solicitors (by far the greater
number), who do not. By and large, the former are "briefed" by the latter when it
is necessary to "take counsel," and it is the solicitor, not the barrister, who deals
with clients. Only solicitors may form partnerships. Barristers are restricted to the
use of the occasional assistant or "junior" in his professional quarters, known as
his "chambers."
23. Jowell, Bargaining in Development Control, 1977 J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 414.
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in which the most common areas for use of section 52 developers'
agreements are set out in full.
21
1. ADDED USE
Twenty-five local authorities reported having bargained with de-
velopers to incorporate a use in the development beyotd that
which the developer had contemplated. While some were incorpo-
rated as a condition to receiving permission for development,'
several were accomplished by section 52 agreement:
(a) to provide space for members of a trade in a new development.
(b) to revert to previous use upon cessation of present use.
(c) to use for agricultural purposes only."
2. PUBLIC RIGHTS OF WAY
Seventeen local authorities reported securing from developers,
agreements that the latter would provide public rights of way over
land for which development permission was sought. There is,
however, some apparent legal difficulty in obtaining such an agree-
ment as a condition to the grant of permission to develop. 2 Five
authorities did so by means of a section 52 agreement. In several
cases, the grant of right-of-way included construction of footpaths,
a bridge or the widening of a roadway."
3. DEDICATION OF LAND
Sixteen local authorities required developers to dedicate land for
some kind of public use or purpose: open space, recreation,
amenity. In several cases, the developer was required to provide
maintenance or building funds. The majority of these cases were
negotiated through section 52 agreements.29
4. EXTINGUISHING EXISTING RIGHTS TO USE
Fourteen local authorities reported requiring developers to give up
a use to which they were otherwise entitled. Again the majority
were by means of 52 agreements. Among the uses "extinguished"
24. The study surveyed 106 of 370 local authorities in England (28 pecent) and
responses were obtained from 87. Id. at 418 and n.19.
25. Fawcett Properties, Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council, [1960] 3 All E. R.
503.
26. Jowell, supra note 23, at 420.
27. Hall & Co. v. Shoreham-by-the-Sea Urban Dist. Council, [1964] 1 All
E.R. 1.
28. Jowell, supra note 23, at 421.
29. Id. at 422-23.
by such agreements were a gas station, a factory, an office and a
parking lot. Nonconformities were apparently particularly popular
subjects for termination by section 52 agreements.30
5. REHABILITATION OF PROPERTY
Six authorities agreed with developers that certain restorations
should take place before development permission would be
granted. The restoration of land used as a quarry and as a dump
was made the subject of a section 52 agreement.3'
6. INFRASTRUCTURE
Six local authorities reported requiring infrastructure. Three in-
stances were by means of section 52 agreements involving drainage
and sewers.32
As discussed below, "planning gain" was obtained through
"negotiation" outside the section 52 agreement structure for
everything from sports centers and public swimming pools to pub-
lic housing.33
D. "Fettering of Powers": What the
Local Authority May Agree To
Subsection 3(a) of section 52 limits the terms of such agreements to
those which do not "limit" any powers of the authority. "Author-
ity" means "planning authority," usually the local government
legislative body. Taken in its broadest context, this limitation
would conflict with the language setting up the agreement in the
first place, as, by its subject matter, the agreement is bound to
restrict the local authority.' Beyond this, the critical question is
the extent to which local authorities can "fetter the future exercise
of their powers."3 To this, one looks to English case law.
The landmark Brandrose case36 originally set out very broad
parameters for developer's agreements. Unfortunately, it has just
been overruled because it went too far in prohibiting local author-
30. Id. at 423-24.
31. Id. at 425.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 421-26.
34. See discussion in Young & Rowan-Robinson, Section 52 Agreements and
the Fettering of Powers, 1982 J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 673, 673, 677.
35. Id. at 674.
36. Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council v. Brandrose Inv. Ltd.
[1981] 1 W.L.R. 1083.
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ities from exercising their powers.37 In Brandrose, a local govern-
ment gave permission 8 for site development under a "section 52
agreement" which, since the site was occupied, would require the
demolition of certain buildings. However, prior to demolition, the
local government extended the boundaries of a conservation area
to include the site. Local government permission is required prior
to the demolition of buildings in a conservation area. The devel-
oper proceeded to demolish on the basis of his section 52 agree-
ment, and the local government sought to enjoin demolition on the
ground that separate permission had not been obtained. The court
held that a section 52 agreement could prevent a local government
from exercising its land planning powers to prevent such demoli-
tion. The court also held that a local government could restrict the
exercise of all its land planning powers except where the subse-
quent exercise would be in accordance with an adopted develop-
ment plan (or a direction by the Secretary of State for the Environ-
ment based on such a development plan), as set out in section 52. 39
On appeal, the court of appeal specifically disagreed with that
part of the lower court decision which prevented the local author-
ity from extending the boundaries of a conservation district,
thereby requiring permission to demolish buildings within it. In-
deed, the court of appeal suggested that since a local authority
could not bind itself not to exercise statutory powers under which it
would be performing a "public duty," parts of a section 52 agree-
ment could always become "ineffective" if conditions-as here-
changed between the time the agreement was executed and the
time the authority undertook its "public duty" in granting permis-
sion for development. °
A number of English decisions broadly state the principle that
any body charged with "statutory powers" cannot "fetter" itself in
the use of such powers.4' While these cases either predate the first
37. Extending Scope of Conservation Area, Times Law Report, 3 Feb. 1983
(judgment Jan. 27, 1983).
38. "Planning permission" is permission to use land for purposes of develop-
ment as set out in the Town and Country Planning Acts. "Development is
extremely broadly defined as any new use in, on, over or under land." For full
discussion see Garner & Callies, supra note 17.
39. See Young & Rowan-Robinson, supra note 34, at 679-81.
40. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1083.
41. York Corp. v. Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd., [1924] 1 Ch. 557; William
Cory & Son Ltd. v. London Corp. [1951] 2 K.B. 476; Southead-on-Sea Corp.
v. Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd., [19621 1 Q.B. 416.
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Brandrose decision or are otherwise distinguishable, the reversal
of Brandrose on appeal gives these cases new significance. For
example, in one case,42 a local authority had agreed under a prede-
cessor of section 5243 not ot exercise its statutory powers to restrict
future development of the subject property. The court found that
the statute under which the agreement had been made was meant
to allow the local authority to accept developer promises placing
conditions upon development, not to permit the local authority to
restrict its statutory powers. In a second (1969) case," a local
authority agreed not to condemn a site so long as it was used for a
private sports ground. If it ceased to be so used, the authority
acquired an option to purchase which, if unexercised, would per-
manently bar it from compulsory acquisition. The court agreed
with a subsequent local authority that the agreement was unen-
forceable against it. However, nothing in the report of the case
indicated the agreement was based on any statutory provision.45
E. Development Agreements: The Effect of
the British Common Law and
Some Commentary6
Several items are worth noting before proceeding to the matter
of "planning gain" (subdivision-like exactions) and developers'
agreements in England. First, as in the United States it is possible
for a local government to exempt any and all of its land use controls
from a "freeze;" likewise in England it is possible for a local
government to preserve all its statutory powers by so stating in a
section 52 agreement.47 Of course, this might make such an agree-
ment unattractive to a developer. 8 Second, it is clear from the
second Brandrose decision that an authority cannot "fetter" cer-
tain statutory powers at all. This may include all statutory powers
other than those conferred by the 1971 Town and Country Plan-
ning Act in which section 52 is found.49 Third, it has been suggested
42. Ransom & Lush, Ltd. v. Surbiton Borough Council, [1949] 1 Ch. 180.
43. Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, § 34.
44. Triggs v. Staines Urban Dist. Council, [1969] 1 Ch. 10.
45. See Young & Rowan-Robinson, supra note 34, at 677.
46. Id. at 681-84. See also Hawke, Planning Agreements in Practice, 1981
J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 5.
47. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1083.
48. Id.
49. R.N.D. HAMILTON, A GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING 354 (7th
ed. 1982), as noted in Young & Rowan-Robinson, supra note 34, at 682; see also
D. HEAP, supra note 17, at 130.
VOL. 17, No. 3 SUMMER 1985
DEVELOPERS' AGREEMENTS 607
a section 52 agreement can not restrict the power of local govern-
ment over land other than that to which the agreement applies.:
This may affect its utility for planning gain. Fourth, section 52
absolutely prohibits a local government from contracting out of its
development plan or any order of the Secretary of State for the
Environment in relation to that plan. It has been suggested,
however, that a local government might not escape some liability if
its principal purpose in amending its development plan was to
frustrate the section 52 agreement.5'
Other areas often covered by agreements52 which are usually
upheld if reasonably related to development permissions include
type of occupancy to be permitted;53 abrogation, restriction or
modification of otherwise permitted uses of land; 4 regulation of
future development of land; regulation of complex development;
regulation of sewage and drainage; pollution control; and enforce-
ment.
III. Developers' Agreements and Planning Gain
A. Planning Gain Defined and Criticized
In its broadest context, planning gain is promises for planning or
community benefits "collateral to the scheme in question," which
are extracted from developers seeking permission from local gov-
ernment to develop by withholding such permission until a section
52 or similar agreement has been executed.5 However, a close
reading of applicable statutes and commentary results in a much
more limited definition:16
[P]lanning gain occurs when in connection with the obtaining of a planning
permission, a developer offers, agrees or is obliged to incur some expenditure,
surrender some right or concede some benefit which would not, or arguably
could not, be embodied in a valid planning condition.
Implicit in this definition is the assumption that those types of
concessions or contributions which are authorized under the rel-
50. Young & Rowan-Robinson, supra note 34, at 683.
51. Id. at 683-84.
52. See, e.g., Hawke, supra note 46, at 6-14.
53. Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council, 1961 A.C. 636.
54. Little-used on the ground that one needs local development permission for
virtually all development, even if "permitted" by the terms of the local develop-
ment plan. See Garner & Callies, supra note 17.
55. PROPERTY ADVISORY GROUP, PLANNING GAIN, § 1.01 (1981); Ward, Plan-
ning Bargaining: Where Do We Stand? 1981 J. PLAN. & ENV'T. L. 74, 75.
56. PLANNING GAIN, supra note 55, at § 3.01.
evant statutes as conditions attached to development permission
are not (and should not be) the subject of section 52 agreements.57
This is the position taken by the Property Advisory Group (to the
United Kingdom Department of the Environment) in its recent
report, Planning Gain, a follow-up on its criticism of planning gain
contained in its earlier report, Structure and Activity of the De-
velopment Industry." There is a separate body of case law which
deals with those things that may properly be the subject of so-
called "planning conditions" which local governments are autho-
rized to impose "as they think fit." 59 This last broad grant of
authority has been limited by the courts, however, to those condi-
tions which ". . . fairly and reasonably relate to the permitted
development. The authority are not at liberty to use their powers
for an ulterior object, however desirable the object may seem to
them to be in the public interest."I
The PAG report predictably fueled a growing debate over the
legality of bargaining for planning gain through the vehicle of the
section 52 agreement. Through such agreements, local authorities
were apparently seeking to obtain "ultra vires" conditions through
the "voluntary" agreement process,61 a process labelled by one
prominent attorney as "blackmail-sales of planning [development]
permission."62 The prestigious Law Society's Standing Committee
on Planning Law and Land Development (one of two rough coun-
terparts to the ABA Section on Urban, State and Local Govern-
ment Law) "broadly" accepted the conclusions-largely nega-
tive--of the PAG report,63 allowing as how "the increasing use
made by local planning authority of their powers of development
control for the purpose of negotiating some form of public or
community benefit is a cause of some concern within the
profession. '"I The committee's principal concerns were: (1) that
57. Id. at § 2.00.
58. Id. at §§ 5.11 and 5.12.
59. Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, ch. 78, § 29.
60. Pyx Granite Co. v. Ministry of Hous. and Local Gov't, [1958] 1 Q.B. 554,
572.
61. Planning Gain: The Law Society's Observations, supra note 12, at 346;
1982, Heap & Ward, Planning Bargaining: The Pros and the Cons, 1980 J. PLAN.
& ENV'T L. 631. McLoughlin, Planning Gain: Another Viewpoint, 1982 J. PLAN.
& ENV'T L. 352; Ward, Planning Bargaining: Where Do We Stand?, 1982
J. PLAN. & ENV'T. L. 74; previous literature on planning gain is listed in the
bibliography to PROPERTY ADVISORY GROUP, PLANNING GAIN, supra note 55.
62. Ward, supra note 61, at 80.
63. Planning Gain: The Law Society's Observations, supra note 12, at 346.
64. Id.
SUMMER 1985608 THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 17, No. 3
DEVELOPERS' AGREEMENTS 609
the potential of "free" gain would influence local authorities'
decisions on development permission, which should be guided by
statutory planning considerations; (2) that the hope of planning
gain obscures the "fundamental principle" at the root of the Brit-
ish system, which is that a developer is entitled to permission for
any development to which there is no substantial planning objec-
tion; (3) that bargaining for planning gain is inconsistent with the
development control function which is essentially negative; (4)
that section 52 agreements are really not voluntary because to
appeal a denial of permission which may be based on refusal to
enter into such an agreement for planning gain is both time-
consuming and costly; (5) that planning gain badly distorts the tax
system, which is the statutory vehicle for returning to the commu-
nity part of private development gain which arises from the grant-
ing of development permission; and (6) that local government is
essentially taking unfair and illegal advantage of its position.65
With this broad approval in mind, it is useful to briefly describe
what planning gain is in practice, and the PAG views thereon.
B. Planning Gain in Practice
Starting with the proposition that "[w]e are unable to accept that,
as a matter of general practice, planning gain has any place in our
system of planning control,"' the PAG report sets out essentially
seven examples of situations in which local government seeks
"planning gain," and finds but two acceptable "special excep-
tions. "67
1. Infrastructure: Where a section 52 agreement provides for
payment for services/infrastructure beyond requirements of
the developer's site, especially if aimed to benefit the neigh-
borhood generally. This is a fairly common practice. 68
2. Public Amenities: The local government under a section 52
agreement requires a developer at his own expense to pro-
vide public open space, recreational or social facilities. PAG
found this "very common." So did a recent survey, though
not always by means of section 52 agreements.69
3. Discontinuance of Use: The developer is asked to agree to
discontinue a nonconforming use (or tear down derelict
65. Id. at 348-49.
66. PLANNING GAIN, supra note 55, at § 6.02.
67. Id. at § 4.02.
68. Jowell, supra note 22, at 425.
69. Id. at 422-24.
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buildings) in return for development permission to construct
a commercial or industrial development on a conforming
site, even though such new development would not create an
"over-provision" of such uses in the area. A recent survey
indicated this "extinguishing existing use" through section 52
agreements to be very common.7'
4. Rehabilitation of Buildings: In return for development per-
mission, to change the use of an "architecturally merito-
rious" building, a developer is asked to restore its deterio-
rated external facade, even though there is no connection
between use and facade. A recent survey found this to be
commonplace, but not necessarily by means of section 52
agreements."7
5. Environmental Treatment: A developer of commercial or
residential development gets development permission after
agreeing to lay out his development in such a way as to open
up a view or otherwise achieve an aesthetic or visual effect
unconnected with the scheme itself.
6. Public Rights: A developer with a site near a scenic area
agrees, in return for development permission, to dedicate
land for open space or public right-of-way in order for the
general public to enjoy the area. A recent survey found this
to be the most likely element for bargaining/planning gain,
though not always--or even primarily-through section 52
agreements.'
7. Payments of Money: The local government asks a devel-
oper to make a payment toward the restoration of an historic
building "or other worthy cause" that bears no relation to the
proposed development, if development permission is
granted.
The exceptions which PAG is prepared to accept:73
1. When public facilities/services necessary for the proposed
development are for some reason off-site, and it is therefore
technically difficult to make a statutory condition for de-
velopment permissions.
2. Certain mixed-use developments where individual parts
might be objectionable unless viewed as a whole and with
70. Id. at 423.
71. Id. at 224-25.
72. Id. at 422-23.
73. PLANNING GAIN, supra note 55, at §§ 7.02 and 7.04.
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some nonrequired amenity-like clearing non-greenbelt
sites for permission to develop in a greenbelt.
IV. Conclusion: Development as a Privilege?
It is clear that many of these methods of achieving planning gain
have counterparts in United States experience, which will in-
creasingly come about through annexation and developers' agree-
ments as state courts continue to chip away at vested rights or,
indeed, any "right" to develop land. Indeed, the totality of land
regulation in states like Hawaii and California raises an increas-
ingly common philosophical issue: is the use of land a right or a
privilege? Unquestionably, it started out as a right. Blessed with a
surfeit of undeveloped land virtually from its inception, the history
of the United States is that of land acquisition and development
throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The plentiful supply of undeveloped land was a critical factor in the
population and settlement of the nation.74 It is more than a hun-
dred years since Frederick Jackson Turner implicitly raised the
question: what happens when we run out of new lands to settle?75
As many parts of the United States became highly developed and
uses of land overlapped, the question of competing land uses
became increasingly critical.76 Thus, while controls had always
been within our land philosophy,7 they became increasingly preva-
lent in the mid-twentieth century. 78
Disputes over whether land use is a right or a privilege charac-
terize much of the thought-provoking literature in the past decade.
Some preferred to see the development of land continue as a right
of ownership. 79 Others expressed a desire to move toward other
Anglo-American systems of land development where, if the right
to develop had not yet metamorphosized into a privilege dispensed
by government, it at least was subject to special scrutiny as
"affected with a public interest " "° if not paid for outright as in a
74. A. STRONG, LAND BANKING 24-36 (1979). See generally B. HUBBARD, A
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (1965).
75. See generally F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920).
76. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROL 3-4 (1971).
77. Id. at 1-2; F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE, ch. 6
(1973).
78. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 76, at 2.
79. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 77, at ch. 8.
80. Babcock & Feurer, Land As a Commodity "Affected With A Public In-
terest," 52 WASH. L. REV. 289 (1977).
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"windfall" to compensate those whose development rights were
"wiped out" by public land use control decisions."1 While no
United States jurisdiction has, as in England, formally abolished
or "nationalized" the right to develop land, we have not yet
decided whether land development is a private right, which may be
regulated for health, safety and welfare of the people at large, or a
privilege, for which a private landowner must seek permission
and/or pay. How the states deal with such issues as vested rights
and land use controls may well decide the utility of-if not the
necessity for-developers' agreements.
81.D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE
CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978).
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